The
Devastation
Framework
by
Richard
Kunstman
Introduction
The following report describes the efforts of the Forest
Service's Region 5 to secure public approval for the revision of
the 2001 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment (also known as the"Conservation Framework"). The Framework, which was acclaimed as
a landmark plan for scientific forest management, limited the
size of trees that could be logged to 20 inches diameter at
breast height (DBH). The revision permits logging of larger
trees -- 20 to 30 inches DBH -- to accommodate the wishes of the
timber industry.
Region 5 is working hard to gain public approval for this
unpopular decision, which has been criticized by Forest Service
scientists as well as nationally recognized members of the Union
of Concerned Scientists. To impress the public, Region 5 has
published a slick brochure titled"Forests with a Future," that
panders to the public's fear of wildfire and distorts the
efficacy of the proposed revision. This report includes some of
the text and graphics from the brochure to expose the
distortions that create false impressions of security and
ecological improvements.
Background
1990s - The Northern Spotted Owl dispute in the Pacific
Northwest Forests (Region 5) lead to the report on the California
Spotted Owl (CASPO) that laid the groundwork for the"Interim
Guidelines" for Region 5 forest management.
During the 1990s there were confrontations, appeals, and
lawsuits between Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) and the
Forest Service relating to the management of the national
forests of the Sierra Nevada (Region 5). In an effort to avoid
the"Train-Wreck" situation -- that occurred on the forests of
the Pacific Northwest (Region 6) as a result of the 1991 court
Decision on the Northern Spotted Owl
2
-- the Pacific Southwest
Research Station undertook a study of the California Spotted
Owl. In 1992, the CASPO technical report on the owl's status was
published. CASPO
11
recommended"Interim Guidelines" for
management of forests to preserve the options for the owl's
viability. In 1993, Region 5 adopted the interim guidelines
until a final Management Plan could be developed, that would
assure the survival of the owl as a species. The guidelines
prohibited logging of trees larger than 30 inches diameter at
breast height (DBH) and required retention of 40 percent of the
basal area in the largest trees in any"cut unit."
For those unfamiliar with the term,"Basal Area" (BA) is the
surface area of all the stumps that would remain if all the
trees in an acre were cut off at breast height.
1993 - The timber industry reacts to the adoption of the Interim
Guidelines.
Adoption of the Interim Guidelines was greeted with dismay by
the timber industry that wanted to continue logging the
old-growth forests that comprise the owl's habitat. In a typical
exaggeration, Bill Dennison - an industry spokesperson - stated:"This will cause the loss of 10,000 jobs and bring the
California economy to a grinding halt." Never mind that the
expected reduction in timber output from the national forests
was about 30 percent and the previous annual output from the
Sierra Nevada national forests was approximately 1.5 billion
board feet. A generous estimate of national forest component of
employment in the industry at that time was 4
jobs per million
board feet annually, or a total of 6,000 jobs that would be
reduced by 30 percent (about 1,800 jobs). The California economy
survived.
The CASPO report became the basis for many appeals that were
filed on national forest projects. The agency's reviewing
officers upheld the vast majority of these appeals. Some of
those that were denied became the subjects of litigation and in
most cases the courts found for the plaintiffs.
1995 - Under threat of litigation, the region released a Draft
Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement in January
1995. Several iterations of the plan finally lead to adoption of
the Conservation Framework in January 2001.
Responding to the threat of litigation to compel preparation of
the management plan envisioned by the Interim Guidelines, Region
5 published a Draft Management Plan and Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) in January 1995.7
Comments on this plan argued
that the DEIS failed to disclose the uncertainties in the
outcomes predicted by the models used to develop the
prescriptions embodied in the plan. In August 1996, the Region
published a Revised plan (RDEIS)
8
that was severely criticized
for its failure to incorporate the science published in the June
1996 Report to Congress by the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project (SNEP)"The
Status of the Sierra Nevada."
3
This report was the result
of a three-year study of the entire ecosystem by more than 100
scientists from federal agencies, academia, and recognized
experts in the various disciplines.
1997 - To forestall possible litigation, the administration
convenes a Federal Advisory Committee to review the RDEIS for
scientific adequacy.
Anticipating the potential for prolonged litigation, the
Administration in 1997 convened a committee of independent
scientists under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to
review the RDEIS for scientific adequacy. The report by this
committee - issued in late 1997 - scathingly criticized the RDEIS as failing to assure the viability of the California
Spotted Owl and also a failure as"An Ecosystem Approach" - the
subtitle used for the RDEIS.
The Regional Forester Lynn Sprague, then convened a committee of
scientists from the various branches of the Pacific Southwest
Research Laboratories to review the SNEP report and identify
which portions were applicable to forest management. After
completing their reviews on the various applicable disciplines,
the reports were submitted to independent experts in academia
for peer review and the resulting Scientific Consistency Review
was published in July, 1998.
9
Conservation Framework
The Region 5 office then prepared a new plan -"The Conservation
Framework" -- based on the Scientific Consistency Review,
proposals from various NGOs, and industrial interests. In April,
2000 the new Regional Forester, Bradley Powell, published the
Framework DEIS, which analyzed eight Alternatives. Including the
required"No Action" Alternative, which would continue
management practices under the CASPO interim Guidelines, these
Alternatives spanned the range from the absurd"No Commercial
Logging" to the theological"We Must Cut the Forest Down to
Prevent it From Burning Up." Following the 90-day comment
period, the planning team made alterations in some of the
Alternatives and added a"Modified Alternative 8" -- which
became the"Preferred Alternative - and published the final EIS
in January, 2001.10
At the same time, Forester Powell issued his"Record of
Decision" adopting Modified Alternative 8 and Chief Forester Dr.
Jack Ward Thomas approved the decision. The Framework was
acclaimed broadly as a landmark plan for scientific forest
management. Emphasis was directed to protection of communities
-- with aggressive fuel reduction treatments in a 1/4 mile"Defense Zone"
and less intensive treatments in a 1-1/4 mile"Threat Zone." Outside these protective zones, logging was
limited to trees less than 20 inches DBH. The Framework also
emphasized the use of Prescribed Fire -- as a means of reducing
the excessive fuel loads that lead to catastrophic wildfires -
and to restore the ecological functions of natural fire.
From Conservation to Devastation
Later in 2001, Chief Forester Thomas resigned. The new Chief,
Dale Bosworth, reassigned Regional Forester Powell and replaced
him with the current Forester Jack Blackwell, who - under
pressure from the timber industry -- immediately began gathering
information to justify logging of trees up to 30 inches DBH. A
committee of scientists was convened to perform a"Meta-Analysis" on all the California Spotted Owl data. The
committee report showed that - for some of the 41 models
examined - the experimentally determined value for"Lambda,"
within the 95 percent confidence intervals, could be greater
than 1.0 - a significant increase from the experimentally
measured values.
"Lambda" is the statistical value that describes the
reproductive success of a species. A value of 1.0 means that the
population is stable - individuals that are lost by death,
disease, or natural disasters, are replaced by new individuals.
A value greater than 1.0 implies that the population is
increasing toward a new stability level. A value less than 1.0
indicates that the population is headed toward extinction.
Of course the 95 percent confidence intervals also imply that
the true value of Lambda could be significantly smaller than the
experimentally determined value. The committee report did not
discuss forest management prescriptions, recommending only that
future data gathering protocols be uniform among the various
forests.
In 2003, Regional Forester Blackwell published the"Supplementary DEIS" with revised logging prescriptions, that
permitted cutting of trees up to 29.9 inches DBH. A portion of
the report on"An Investigation into the Bush Administration's
Misuse of Science"
6
by 60 scientists (20 Nobel Laureates) of the
Union of Concerned Scientists commented:
In an incident involving the management of national forests, the
Bush administration created a five-person"review team" made up
of predominantly nonscientists who proceeded to overrule a $12
million science-based plan for managing old-growth forest
habitat and reducing the risk of fire in 11 national forests.
This so-called Sierra Nevada Framework, which was adopted by the
Clinton administration in 2001 after nine years of research by
more than 100 scientists from the Forest Service and academia,
had been viewed by the experts who reviewed it as an exemplary
use of credible science in forest policy.
The Bush administration's proposed changes to the plan include
harvesting more of the largest trees, which may double or triple
harvest levels over the first 10 years of the plan. Other
changes call for relaxing restrictions on cattle grazing in some
areas where the original plan significantly reduced grazing due
to the potentially critical impact on sensitive species.
Forest Service officials justified these changes in part by stating that the original plan relies too much on prescribed burning and would fail to"effectively protect the general forest areas from fire." Contrary to Forest Service claims that their recommendations are based on"new information and findings," the proposed revisions appear to lack any scientific basis. In fact, a scientific review panel put together by the Forest Service found that the revisions failed to consider key scientific information regarding fire, impacts on forest health, and endangered species.
In response to the outcry by the scientific and environmental communities, the anticipated appeals, and the probable litigation challenging the basis for the revision, the Region embarked on a PR campaign - hoping to win in the court of public opinion what it is likely to lose in the court of law. $90,000 was paid to a San Francisco PR company for advice on procedure and another $23,000 was spent on publication of a brochure, entitled"FORESTS WITH A FUTURE," that attempts to persuade the reader that the Revised Framework will result in reduced catastrophic wildfires, increased old-growth forest, and improved wildlife habitat.

Figure -- 1
Figure 1 shows the pictures associated with the three brochure
inserts. These are obviously an effort to generate fear -- an
emotional response -- and create the impression that
implementation of the revision allowing 30 inch DBH trees to be
logged will avert the fearful consequences. No credible
explanation is provided to support this implication -"trust us."

Notice that the graph begins to depart from the linear increase
in the mid 1990s when timber harvests were declining. Although
the text of the brochure states"We need future forests more
like past forests," the projection for"Annual Acres Burned"
only achieves a 30 percent reduction toward the 1950 level by
2050.

Figure 3 shows - in addition to the expected reduction in annual
catastrophic fires - the predicted increase in annual acres
burned, as the accompanying text claims:"If nothing new is
done" (dashed red line).
Here again, the obvious purpose of the text is to generate the
emotional response -- fear of catastrophic wildfires. However,
these disastrous predictions rely on the caveat that the"status
quo" will be maintained. The Conservation Framework (which is a
new approach to forest management) proposed the same fuel
reduction strategies as the Supplemental DEIS, but did not
permit logging of trees in the 20 to 30 inch diameter class.
Logging of these large, fire-resistant trees does not contribute
to fuel reduction as demonstrated by the following excerpt from
the April, 1999 analysis by the General Accounting Office in the
report"A Cohesive Strategy is Needed to Address Catastrophic
Wildfire Threats."
4
The agency relies on timber production to fund many of its
programs and activities, and all three of its budget allocation
criteria for timber activities relate solely to the volume of
timber produced or offered. As a result, as forest officials
told us, they tend to (1) focus on areas with high-value
commercial timber rather than on areas with high fire hazards or
(2) include more large, commercially valuable trees in a timber
sale than are necessary to reduce the accumulated fuels.
Similarly, an interagency team that reviewed the implementation
of the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program observed that some
Forest Service personnel focused more on harvesting timber than
on protecting forested ecosystems. This tendency of some agency
personnel was further documented in a 1999 report by the
Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General.

Figures 4 and 5 show respectively, the increases in Old Growth
Trees and Wildlife Habitat that are predicted to occur as a
result of implementation of the"Forests with a Future
Campaign." However, this"Campaign is not scheduled to begin
until the year 2004. Notice that around 1990, the dramatic
declines in Old Growth Trees and Wildlife habitat pass through a
minimum and begin an increasing trend. This reversal correlates
in time (following adoption of the CASPO Interim Guidelines)
with the period when activists began successfully challenging
destructive timber sales, and the courts issued injunctions
compelling the Forest Service to comply with the laws and their
own standards and guidelines.

Figure 6 is probably the most blatantly deceptive illustration
in the Campaign Brochure. The left hand picture shows a
catastrophic wildfire that results when"fuel ladders" are
intact. The right hand picture shows a well-behaved,
ecologically-beneficial, cleansing fire that is expected when the"fuel ladders" are removed. This latter fire is typical of
those that burned prior to Euro-contact. They killed most of the
susceptible seedlings, that could become fuel ladders if they
survived, and spared the large, fire-adapted trees.
The logging frenzy, which altered the natural forest structures
and microclimates, also left enormous amounts of surface fuel
accumulations. These, combined with the misguided fire
suppression policy, resulted in the excessive undergrowth that
characterizes the forests today.
Only an unrealistic fanatic would argue that these fuel ladder
trees should not be removed. This is a matter of common sense
supported by the best available science. However, the Forests
with a Future Campaign differs from the Conservation Framework's
vegetation management prescriptions only in that it permits the
logging of the larger (20 to 30 inch) trees.
Trees in the 20 to 30 inch size class would be between 65 and 95
years old and would range in height from 85 to 140 feet. The
base of their crowns would be a minimum of 30 feet above ground
level. Additionally, at this age the bark of many trees is
fire-resistant. Fire scientists report that a hot ground fire --
that bakes the needles in the over-story -- is necessary for a
crown fire to persist. Theoretical analysis - using the Forest
Service's Farsite modeling software - shows that crown fires
will not occur when"ladder trees" are removed and surface fuels
are consumed by"underburning." (SNEP, vol. II, Chapter 43)
These theoretical results have also been empirically confirmed
by post-wildfire observations. Nevertheless, the Supplementary
DEIS proposes to log about 183,000 trees in the 20 to 30 inch
size range each year for five decades.
Consider carefully the trees that remain in figure 6 after the"fuel ladder" trees have been removed. Assuming the largest tree
is 40 inches DBH, this tree would be about 140 years old. Now
consider the size of the largest"fuel ladder" tree proposed for
removal. This tree is about 1/4 the size of the largest tree (10
inches DBH) - not the 20 to 30 inch DBH that the Supplementary
DEIS proposes to remove. Notice also, that the remaining
intermediate tree - retained in the right hand picture - is less
than ½ the size of the large tree, with its crown base well
above the anticipated flame length.
Conclusion
In 1991, the Sacramento Bee published a 5-part series of
articles by journalist Tom Knudsen entitled"Sierra In Peril."
5
Knudsen described the various damages to the Sierra Nevada
ecosystem that resulted from unrestrained clear-cut logging and
poorly managed livestock grazing. His observations were
confirmed with rigorous science in the 1996 SNEP report. The
outgrowth of these observations and science was a scientifically
sound management plan"The Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment."
Once again, the Sierra is in Peril. The revisions in the"Supplementary Forest Plan Amendment" reinstitute the practice
of logging large, old-growth trees - reaffirming the Forest
Service's mindset that maximizing fiber production is the
primary objective.
It's clear that there is no need to remove the larger trees in
order to reduce the risk for high-severity, catastrophic
wildfires. The analysis of the information, shown in the Region
5's own brochure, as well as a large body of solid science,
confirms this. The corollary conclusion is that the only reason
for logging the larger trees is to accommodate the desires of
the timber industry, because the"ladder fuel" trees -- and
trees in the less than 20 inch size class -- are considered"sub-merchantable,"
i.e., not attractive to a potential timber sale purchaser.
References:
1. Agee, James K., Fire Ecology of Pacific Northwest Forests,
Island Press, 1718 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC,
20009, 1993.
2. Dwyer, William L., Memorandum Decision and Injunction,
Seattle Audubon Society, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John L. Evans,
et al., Defendants, United States District Court Western
District of Washington at Seattle, Docket No. C89-160WD, May 23,
1991.
3. Erman, Don C., et.al., Status of the Sierra Nevada, Centers
for Water and Wildlands Resources, University of California,
Davis, Wildlands Resources Center Report No. 39, June 1996. (SNEP).
4. General Accounting Office, A Cohesive Strategy is Needed to
address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, April 1999.
5. Knudsen, Tom, Sierra in Peril, Sacramento Bee, 5-part series,
1991.
6. Union of Concerned Scientists, An Investigation into the Bush
Administration's Misuse of Science: Scientific Integrity in
Policymaking, February 2004.
7. USDA-Forest Service, 1995, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, Managing California Spotted Owl Habitat in the Sierra
Nevada National Forests of California: An Ecosystem Approach.
8. USDA-Forest Service, 1996, Revised Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, Managing California Spotted Owl Habitat in the Sierra
Nevada National Forests of California: An Ecosystem Approach.
9. USDA-FS/PSW, SIERRA NEVADA SCIENCE REVIEW, Report of the
Science Review Team charged to synthesize new information of
rangewide urgency to the national forests of the Sierra Nevada,
July 24, 1998.
10. USDA - Forest Service, Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment,
Final Environmental Impact Statement, January 2001.
11. Verner, J., K.S. McKelvey, B.R. Noon, R.J. Gutierrez, G.I.
Gould, and T.W. Beck, 1992, The California Spotted Owl: A
Technical Assessment of Its Current Status (CASPO), USDA-Forest
Service, Pacific Southwest Research Station, Gen. Tech. Rep.
PSW-GTR-133, Berkeley, CA, 1992.